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I.  Introduction
The unprecedented number of costly bank failures throughout the world in the last two decades
of the twentieth century has focussed attention on the need to determine more appropriate ways
to improve upon the performance of different country's financial systems.  Indeed, a substantial
literature is already emerging on the causes and consequences of financial - mostly banking -
crises, and on various reforms that might help prevent future crises.'  Although the proposed
reforns  differ in important respects, nearly all include changes in existing financial regulations
and supervisory standards.  This central core of agreement is certainly understandable insofar as
the financial crises in countries ranging from the United States and Japan, to Korea and Mexico,-
to Chile and Thailand, to India and Russia, and to Ghana and Hungary have been blamed at least
in part on "bad" regulation and supervision.
In response to this recent and troubling situation, the World Bank, International Monetary.
Fund, and other international financial institutions are attempting to promote financial stability
and economic development by more vigorously urging countries-  to adopt and then to implement
appropriate regulations and supervisory practices for their financial sectors.  The World Bank, for
instance, in virtually all its financial sector reviews and projects-  now stresses more than ever the
importance of prudential regulation and supervision.  The overwhelming belief is that many
countries can significantly improve upon their existing financial systems, thereby reducing the
likelihood of financial instability and facilitating long-run economic growth. 2 More generally,
there appears to be a universal belief amnong  those who have studied these issues that
See, for example,  Bank  for International  Settlements  (1998);  Barth,  Brumbaugh,  Ramesh,  and Yago
(forthcoming);  Caprio  (1998);  Caprio  and Klingebiel  (1996, 1997);  Demirguc-Kunt  and Detragiache  (1997, 1998);
Garcia,  Lindgren  and Saal (1996);  Goldstein  and Tuner (1996);  Goldstein  (1998); and Radelet  and Sachs  (1998).
2 See  Cull (1997).2
inappropriate regulations and supervisory standards in a country not only retard its long-run
economic growth but also increase the likelihood of a financial crisis that could spread beyond
the country's own borders.
Despite all the agreement on the need for financial reform, however, remarkably there is
relatively little empirical evidence to support any advice regarding specific and comprehensive
regulatory and supervisory reforms.  The reason for this awkward situation is that detailed cross-
country comparisons of financial regulatory and supervisory systems for developing countries do
not yet exist. 3 Without such information economists have nonetheless been able to conclude that
incentives are critical in understanding the behavior of the different agents comprising the
financial sector.  In this regard, it is now recognized that the moral hazard problem has become
more widespread and hence explains in part the recent worldwide outbreak in banking crises. 4
Economists have not yet been able to reach a conclusion, however, about the most appropriate
way to correct the incentive and moral-hazard problems for banks, such as by requiring higher
(and more narrowly defined) capital-to-asset ratios, mandating stricter definition and disclosure
of nonperforming loans, requiring that subordinated debt be issued, or installing "world-class"
supervision.
The inability to reach a conclusion about specific ways to resolve these serious problems
is not surprising insofar as data on the practices of various financial regulatory and supervisory
authorities for a wide of range countries have not been assembled and analyzed.  This lack of
information is quite important because it means that current efforts in reforming financial
'Barth, Nolle  and  Rice  (1997)  provide  fairly  detailed  comparative  information  on  the  bank  regulatory  and
supervisory  systems  for  the 19  G-  10  and  European  Union  countries.  They  provide  relatively  little  analysis,
however, on the appropriate reforms to these systems.
More generally, the moral hazard problem when not contained gives rise to an inefficient allocation of resources.3
regulation and supervision are occurring without even the knowledge as to whether or under
what circumstances these efforts will be successful.  One should realize, moreover, that in
situations in which supervisors' salaries are 5 to 10 percent of those of the 'supervisees,' or in
which individuals can easily move (and usually with ample financial gain) from careers as
regulators to careers with firms being regulated, reform efforts are unlikely to be truly successful.
To be more concrete about the lack of financial regulatory and supervisory data, even
information on the extent to which banks in different developing countries are allowed to and
actually do engage in various securities, insurance, and real estate activities has not yet been
compiled and analyzed. Nor is there systematic compilation and analysis of information on
whether banks can own or be owned by nonfinancial firms for a broad cross-section of countries.
Yet, the extent to which these specific banking activities or banking and commerce inter-
relationships inhibit or promote the development of an efficient and stable financial system or
increase or decrease the likelihood of a banking crisis is largely unknown without such
compilations and analyzes.  In short, many important and pressing questions regarding the
appropriate way to reform financial sector regulation and supervision in many countries
throughout the world cannot currently be adequately answered.
Research on these types of issues, therefore, is of critical importance because it will
enable one to identify better the particular mix of regulations and supervisory standards that
promote well-functioning financial systems. Based upon this identification one then is in a
position to provide better guidance to policymakers on appropriate financial sector reforms.
Already, ongoing research is significantly improving our understanding of the broad
relationships between the type of legal system existing within a country and its financial sector4
development. 5 The somewhat narrower  research being discussed here complements this other
work.
This paper specifically focuses on the regulation and supervision of the banking sector. 6
Efforts to collect detailed and comprehensive information on the different financial regulatory
and supervisory environments that exist in the approximately 185 countries throughout the world
are just beginning, and at present only partial information is available for about 50 countries.
Given this situation, we make use of the information that is available.  Fortunately, the recently
obtained data includes the degree to which regulatory restrictions are imposed on several
important and even controversial activities of banks.  This newer information, together with that
previously gathered, enables us to examine empirically for the first time, albeit in a preliminary
manner, the inter-relationships among some important regulatory, governmental, and financial
variables.
More specifically, the following three questions are examined - with brief answers to
them - in this paper:
(1) Do countries with relatively weak government/bureaucratic systems impose harsher
regulatory restrictions on activities of banks? Answer: yes.
(2)  Do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have poorly functioning banking
systems?  Answer: no, or at least the evidence is mixed.
(3)  Do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have a lower probability of
suffering a banking crisis?  Answer: no; in fact, the results indicate the opposite to be the
5 See  La Porta, Lopez  de Silanes,  Shleifer  and Vishny  (1997, 1998),  Levine  (1997),  and Levine,  Loayza,  and Beck
(1998).
6It should  be noted,  however,  that in many  developing  and emerging  market  economies,  the banking  sector  is the
most important  component  of the financial  system.5
case.  In countries in which the securities activities of banks are restricted, the likelihood
of a banking crisis is greater, ceteris paribus.
The third finding contradicts those who believe that stricter restrictions on the allowable
activities of banks constrains excessive risk-taking behavior, partly by making them easier to
monitor by both the supervisory authorities and market participants. 7 There are two possible
forces that may be at work to produce such a result.  First, to the extent that narrower banking
activities (e.g., making loans) and broader financial activities (e.g., engaging in securities and
insurance activities) are not highly and positively correlated, banks in countries allowing broader
powers are able to benefit by being more diversified in their operations.  This reduces the
likelihood of both failures and crises.'  Second, Hellmann, Murdoch and Stiglitz (1998)
demonstrate that by imposing one specific restriction - deposit interest rate ceilings -- on banks
one may obtain a  more robust banking system, mainly because of higher franchise value
resulting from the restriction.  Our findings, however, indicate that harsher restrictions on those
banks' activities considered here likely lower franchise value, either by limiting profits (reducing
economies of scale and scope) or by increasing the variability of profits (leaving average profits
unchanged but reducing the market value of those profits to the extent that investors prefer less to
more volatility). 9 This means that reducing, if not totally eliminating, these restrictions would
allow greater diversification and thereby enhance franchise value.  This regulatory reform, in
7  In the case of the U.S. savings  and loan debacle,  despite  the fact that  unitary  thrift holding  companies  had
comparatively  few restrictions  on their activities,  including  the mixing  of banking  and commerce,  these  broader
powers  were not found  to be a significant  factor in  the debacle. See,  for example,  Barth (1991).
s  See  Caprio  and Wilson  (1997) for evidence  identifying  a link between  a lack of diversification  and bank failures
in selected  countries.
9 Bankers  frequently  lament  that  restrictions  on their ability  to engage in investment  banking  activities  excludes
thern  from more  profitable  lines  of business. However,  it should  not be the case, at least in the long  run, that one
sector  has a consistently  higher  profit  rate than another,  other  things  equal. For this reason,  the economies  of scale
and scope  argument  is more  persuasive  with  respect  to eliminating  the restrictions.6
turn, would induce more incentive compatible behavior on the part of banks.'"  The gain from
allowing broader banking powers appears to more than offset whatever added complications such
a move towards "universal banking" would imply for monitoring.
These empirical results, of course, are preliminary.  A more extensive dataset will be
assembled to permit an analysis of a wider variety of regulatory issues.  An attempt will also be
made to obtain indicators of the supervisory authorities' and markets participants' ability to
monitor banks.  The database, moreover, will be expanded beyond the 50 countries in our
sample, thereby increasing the power of the empirical tests.
Despite the preliminary nature of these results, they do seem sufficiently robust that
policy makers should consider them, along with the results of  other recent work on banking
crises, in deciding upon the most appropriate way in which to reform bank regulation.  More
specifically, this and other recent research suggests that there are several initial steps that could
be taken to reduce significantly the likelihood of banking crises.  Countries could, among other
things, develop and improve legal systems and information disclosure (see Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache (1997, 1998)); impose rate ceilings on bank deposits (see Hellmann, Murdoch, and
Stiglitz (1998)); establish limits either on the rate at which banks can expand credit or on the rate
of increase in their exposure to certain sectors, such as real estate (see Caprio, Atiyas, and
Hanson (1994) and Barth, Brumbaugh, Ramesh and Yago (1998)); require greater diversification
of bank portfolios (see Caprio and Wilson (1997)); and, based upon the results reported in this
paper, reduce the restrictions on the range of activities in which banks can engage.  Determining
which combination of these recommendations are most appropriate for individual countries that
Some  argue,  moreover,  that bank ownership  of nonfinancial  firms  may improve  corporate  govemance.
"Based  upon an empirical analysis, Puri (1996) concludes that universal banks are better than investment banks at7
are at different stages of development should be the subject of future empirical research.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II reviews some of the recent
literature on the relationship between bank regulation and supervision and banking sector
performance, and the reasons this relationship is a subject of  considerable and sometimes heated
debate.'2 Section III essentially provides a progress report on  the linkages that are found
between bank regulatory restrictiveness, or more accurately the degree to which there are limits
on  bank allowable activities, and bank performance.  Lastly, Section IV summarizes some issues
to be addressed in future research.
II.  Regulation and Performance: Some Issues
All the attention currently being given to the role of government in the financial sector - its
participation as owner of financial intermediaries, its intervention in pricing and allocating credit,
and its role in regulating and supervising financial intermediaries - is not surprising in view of
recent events around the world.  Yet, for decades the size, composition and functioning of the
financial system were generally considered to be unimportant for economic development and
growth, and  therefore usually omitted from standard macroeconomic models and development
texts.' 3 This neglect of the financial system enabled governments more easily to use it for their
own and sometimes relatively narrow purposes.  In many developing countries, for example,
collecting taxes, issuing government debt at low cost, and allocating subsidized credit to
accomplish various government goals were the primary tasks assigned to the financial system.
underwriting  securities.
12 In March  1997,  for instance,  U. S. House  Banking  Committee  Chairman  James  Leach  said that "Mixing
commerce  and banking  simply  doesn't fit our kind of democracy". See Barth,  Brumbaugh,  and Yago (1997,  p.47).
" Given  the focus of this paper, Freixas  and Rochet  (1998),  moreover,  state  "that a microeconomic  theory of banks
could not exist  before  the foundations  of the economics  of information  were laid (in early 1970)...."8
The resulting and severe financial repression in countries operating their financial systems in this
way was a widely,recognized sign of failure.  The response was greater financial liberalization
beginning in the industrial countries and in a few developing countries in the 1970s - in the
former group the degree of financial repression had been negligible -- and spreading more
broadly in the 1980s and 1990s.
The trend towards more liberalized financial systems, however, has not been the only
development.  More than 130 countries have suffered from  exceptionally costly episodes of
banking problems in the past two decades, culminating in the financial crisis in East Asia in
1997-1998. Indeed, the costs to resolve bank failures have amounted to 10, 20, and even 30
percent of GDP in various countries in recent years." 4 Current attention is focused mainly on
Japan, where the nonperforming loans of banks in 1998 are estimated to be as high as $1 trillion,
with associated losses amounting to 40 to 50 percent of this figure according to some press
reports.
Based upon these recent and disturbing developments, it is quite understandable that the
government's role vis-a-vis the financial system is receiving unprecedented attention throughout
the world.  It has long been established that every government will be significantly involved in
the money supply process and, in particular, in assigning lender of last resort responsibilities to a
central bank.' 5 The involvement of governments in the financial system in nearly all countries
has expended beyond these areas, however.  Most recently, for example, governments in many
countries have been establishing explicit deposit insurance schemes.  Overwhelmingly,
4 See  Caprio  and Klingebiel  ( 1997,  p. 80 and 1996,  p. 15)  and Lindgren,  Garcia,  and Saal  (1996, p. 30).
5 In this regard,  see the discussion  of free banking  in Freixas  and Rochet  (1998,  pp. 260-265)9
governments have centered on the banking sector for substantial involvement." 6 But non-banking
institutions have also received growing attention since the adoption of auditing and disclosure
standards by British authorities over 100 years ago and the subsequent growth in securities
market activity.
Bank regulation used to be relatively straightforward: authorities simply decided whether
or not to grant charters, to limit geographical expansion, to prescribe some activities (e.g.,
holding government securities), and to proscribe others (e.g., fraud).  Apart from these kinds of
regulations, banks were largely self-regulating.  But even these relatively few regulations were
not always entirely benign. In the U.S., for example, banking failures were more widespread in
the nineteenth century than in other countries due mainly to limits on intrastate and interstate
branching."'  These limits on geographical expansion led to more bank failures than would have
otherwise occurred.  In effect, this adverse outcome was due to faulty regulation, namely the
restriction on the ability of banks to diversify their loan portfolios geographically.8
Bank failures occurred elsewhere, of course, but in those states in which banks were
allowed to branch and belonged to clearinghouses, there was  better diversification and greater
cooperation to protect banks against loan losses. This combination provided more appropriate
incentives for bankers, and in some cases private bank supervision (with financial incentives for
supervisors), which helped keep failure rates low even during recessions.  Moreover, bank failure
16 There  is disagreement,  however,  as to whether  the  central  bank,  a separate  agency,  or some  combination  thereof
should  regulate  and  supervise  banks.
17  Some states  even limited  banks  to a single  office,  and were known  as unit banking  states.
18  A Dutch  banker's maxim  from earlier  times  was the 'watchtower' theory  in which  banks  should  only lend  as far
as they could see from the top of the watchtower  in the center  of town. The reason is that such loans  would  bear
risks  that they understood  best. However,  geographical  diversification  of lending  proved  to be even  more
important,  as the failure  of unit banks  (i.e., banks  in states permitting  only  a single office)  seems  to indicate.
Similarly,  a major  factor  in the U.S.  savings  and loans  debacle  was poor regulation,  in  the fortn  of the restriction
that institutions  make  long-term,  fixed-rate  home mortgage  loans  that were funded  with  shorter-term  deposits.lo
rates in these types  of states (as in Canada, which allows nationwide branching) were
significantly lower than those in the most restrictive branching  states." 9 And as Benston et al
(1996) point out, moreover, the bank failure rate during 1875-1919 was lower than the
corresponding rate for nonfinancial firms.
Yet, regardless of the fundamental causes of bank failures, the view that banking should
be largely self-regulated was unlikely any more popular in the early 1  870s - when what used to
be called the Great Depression began with a financial crisis reminiscent of the East Asia financial
crisis in 1997 (see De Long (1998)) - than in the 1930s when the entire U.S. banking system
collapsed.  Indeed, few governments are willing to let the banking system suffer a 'systemic'  run,
or even to allow any of the largest banks to close, with the latter situation creating the 'too-big-
to-fail' problem. 20 When a country's  banking system suffers a systemic run, or when insolvent
banks are allowed to remain open without any overt run, the adverse impact on the economy is
substantial.  In the case of widespread bank insolvency, even without a run, the credit system
typically grinds to a halt and unprofitable firms are usually able to roll over their loans resulting
in  a lack of funds for worthwhile investment projects and an inefficient allocation of capital.  In
the case of  widespread bank runs both the payments and credit systems collapse, with the
economy turning to barter and standards of living plummeting further. 2'  Residents of East Asia,
including Japan, are currently discovering the direct and dire consequences of a malfunctioning
credit system, while Indonesia also experienced temporary runs on its banks.
Furthermore,  restrictions  prevented  them  from  hedging  the  resulting  interest  rate  risk.
'9 See Calomiris  (1992),  Gorton  and Mullineaux  (1987),  and Bordo  (1997).
20  See Baer  and Klingebiel  (1995) for a discussion  of and evidence  on the favorable  outcomes  than result when
depositors  are allowed  to incur  losses from  bank failures.
21 The payments  system  may  not collapse  with insolvent  banks  remaining  open but not experiencing  runs. If
interbank  exposures  are covered  by implicit  or explicit  deposit  insurance,  than the payments  system  will likely
continue  to function. When interbank  exposures  are not covered,  solvent  banks  will curtail  and avoid exposure  to11
Even proponents of laissez-faire admit that if they held policy-making positions during a
crisis affecting large banks, they most likely would ignore their own advice that no bank is too
big to fail.  This situation suggests that perhaps one should consider a framework for financial
regulation in which one set of rules would operate during normal times, and which would be
designed to minimize the likelihood of a financial crisis, and another set of rules would operate
when a crisis emerges. 22 Except at the level of generalities - like Bagehot's rule to 'discount
freely and at a penalty rate' -- the set of rules governing a crisis would unlikely be specific, so
that its effect both on  financial sector development and on the occurrence of a financial crisis is
problematic.
The design of an appropriate regulatory environment during normal times, however, is
more tractable.  Nevertheless, the issue is certainly not simple.  The existence of information
asymmetries, coupled with intertemporal transactions, introduce complexities into a financial
system.  Indeed, without problems of incomplete and imperfect information a financial system
would be easy to regulate because it would be quite trivial.  But this is not the case. Banks are
therefore quite difficult to regulate: information problems affect all participants, whether they be
creditors, shareholders, senior bank managers, or even regulators.
A consensus does appear to be emerging that due to the inherent difficulty in monitoring
financial intermediaries the regulatory environment needs to change in such a way that there will
be several 'watchful eyes,' meaning participants in the financial marketplace with information
about banks available to them and the incentives to act on it.  Some countries have already found
merit in this approach and operationalized it. Argentina, for examnple,  has increased capital
insolvent  banks,  thereby  impeding  the efficient  operation  of the payments  system.
'  See Brock  (1998)  for a discussion  of the transition.12
requirements  and set a minimum  that is tied to indicators  of credit and market  risk; required
banks to issue subordinated  debt; strengthened  accounting  and disclosure  requirements;
mandated  external  bank audits; and, more  generally,  improved  supervision. Collectively,  these
reforms  in bank regulation  mean  that owners,  creditors,  and supervisors  are more likely  to
monitor  banks effectively.
Although  the general  direction  in which  many countries  need to move with respect  to
banking  reforms  is clear,  the appropriate  mix of all the different  components  of regulation  and
supervision  is only now  becoming  a subject  of research. For a relatively  few countries,  some
attempts  have been made to provide  a comparative  ranking  of selected  features  of bank
regulation.2"  There is some  indication,  though necessarily  significantly  qualified  due to limited
data availability,  that a tighter  regulatory  environment  - one with tougher  capital  and liquidity
standards,  stricter  definitions  of capital  and nonperforming  loans,  more  widespread  mandatory
provisioning  once a loan is nonperforning,  a greater  presence  of foreign  banks,  and a more
transparent  and better operating  environment  -- will help banking  systems  survive  crises.
Another  important  aspect  to regulation  that has received  even  less attention  recently,  and
one which  the next section  attempts  to address,  concerns  the allowable  activities  of banks. For
example,  do banks that are allowed  to engage  in financial  activities  beyond  less-traditional
commercial  banking  activities  - such as securities  underwriting  and dealing,  insurance
underwriting  and brokerage,  real  estate investment  and development  and nonfinancial  firm
ownership  and control  - intermediate  more efficiently,  and are they less prone  to a financial
crisis? The answer  is not clear. Proponents  of the separation  of commercial  and investment
banking  in the U.S. during  the 1  930s argued  that there are inherent  conflicts  of interest  between13
the two businesses, not withstanding the fact that anything other than "arm's length" transactions
would be bad for business over the long term.  Kroszner and Rajan (1994), however, find no
empirical evidence to support the view that problems arise because of the potential conflict of
interest.
Furthermore, White (1986), among others, maintains that universal banks may be better
diversified, and hence more stable.  Yet, some bank supervisors argue that combining traditional
and nontraditional activities makes banks harder to supervise by the regulatory authorities. In
addition, Rajan (1998) suggests that allowing banks to engage in a wide range of activities
increases the difficulty of monitoring by market participants.  The implication of this view is that
harder-to-monitor banks are more likely to pose problems. Indeed, Rajan more generally urges
emerging market countries that are considering universal banking to proceed cautiously, while
also indicating there is a need for further empirical research in this area.  This paper attempts to
begin this research effort by investigating the impact of selected bank regulatory restrictions on
various measures of performance, deferring to future research an assessment of the linkages
between the broader regulatory environment and financial sector and,  more generally, economic
outcomes.
III. Regulatory  Restrictions,  Governmental  Bureaucracy,  and Banking  Sector  Performance
This section empirically examines the interrelationships among: (a) regulatory restrictions on the
activities of banks, (b) the ability of government/bureaucratic systems to operate effectively, (c)
the level of development and efficiency of the banking sector, and (d) the fragility of the banking
system.  This examination is based upon newly assembled data for a cross-section of 45
23 See, for example, Caprio (1998), Ramos (1997) and JP Morgan (1997).14
countries.  Specifically, the following three questions are addressed:
1.  Do countries with relatively weak government/bureaucratic systems -- measured in
terms of corruption, bureaucratic redtape, and the degree to which a country holds to
the rule of law -- impose  harsher  regulatory  restrictions  on the activities  of banks  --
measured in terms of allowable securities activities, insurance activities, real estate
activities, and ownership of nonfinancialfirms?
2.  Do countries with relatively restrictive regulatory systems have poorer functioning
banking systems -- as measured by deposit money bank credit to the private sector
relative to GDP, bank overhead expenditures relative to total assets, and net interest
income relative to total assets?
3.  Do countries with relatively restrictive regulatory systems have lower probabilities of
suffering a banking crisis -- where a country is deemed to have had a crisis if the
estimated losses  from bank failures are greater than five percent of GDP?
Cross-country evaluations of national regulatory regimes form the basis for answering all
three questions.  The first subsection describes our assessment of the restrictiveness of national
regulatory systems. The second subsection discusses measures of government/bureaucratic
systems.  The subsequent subsections contain the evidence pertaining to each of the three
questions.
A.  Regulatory Restrictions on Bank Activities15
This paper constructs quantitative data on allowable nontraditional activities of banks using
information from Barth, Nolle, and Rice (1997), Kyei (1995), Akamatsu (1995) the Institute of
International Bankers (Global Survey-various years), Euromoney (Banking Yearbook 1995),
and various central bank and government sources.  It is this data that forms the basis for the
assessment of the restrictiveness of national regulatory systems.
The empirical analysis is specifically based upon the degree to which a country's
regulatory system allows banks to engage in the following four nontraditional activities:
*  Securities: the ability of banks to engage in the businesses of securities underwriting,
brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund business.
- Insurance: the ability of  banks to engage in insurance underwriting and selling.
*  Real Estate: the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, development and
management.
*  Nonfinancial Firm Ownership: the ability of banks to own and control nonfinancial
firns.
Based upon the analysis of  available documents, each country's regulations concerning
these nontraditional activities has been assessed. These assessments are used to assign a number
between one and four to each activity - Securities, Insurance, Real Estate, and Nonfinancial Firm
Ownership - that indicates the degree of regulatory restrictiveness for that activity in each
country. The assigned numbers are interpreted as follows:
1 --  indicates "unrestricted": banks can engage in the full range of the activity directly in the
bank.
2  --  indicates "permitted": the full range of those activities can be conducted, but all or some
of the activity must be conducted in subsidiaries.
3  --  indicates "restricted": banks can engage in less than full range of to activity,  either in
the bank or subsidiaries.16
-- 4  indicates "prohibited": the activity may not be conducted by the bank or subsidiaries.
The numerical scores assigned to each of the four activities for the countries in our
sample are summarized in Appendix Table 1. A summary index is also computed for the overall
regulatory restrictiveness of all four activities of banks. Specifically, RESTRICT equals the
average value of Securities, Insurance, Real Estate, and Nonfinancial Firm Ownership, so that
RESTRICT takes on values between I (least restrictive) and 4 (most restrictive).  The average
value of RESTRICT is 2.2, with a standard deviation of 0.6.  There are five countries with very
restrictive regulatory systems (RESTRICT > 3): Chile, Ecuador, Indonesia, Japan, and Peru.
There are six countries with very permissive systems (RESTRICT < 1.5): Austria, Israel,
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  The United States has a value of 3.
These data on regulatory restrictiveness clearly involve some degree of subjectivity.  As
more detailed and comprehensive information becomes available, we will therefore update the
data and the results that follow.  Nonetheless, the currently available data and the approach taken
provide new and useful -though  certainly not unassailable - information regarding the
interrelationships among regulatory regimes, government/bureaucratic systems, banking sector
development and especially banking sector fragility.
B.  Government/Bureaucratic Systems
Information about the effectiveness of governrent/bureaucratic  systems is used for two reasons.
First, the paper seeks to assess the relationship between the quality of the governmental
bureaucracy and the restrictiveness of the regulatory regime.  To perform such an assessment one
needs quantitative measures regarding the manner in which the government operates.  Second,17
the paper seeks to assess the relationship between the restrictiveness of the regulatory regime and
both banking sector development and the fragility of the banking system.  To make this
assessment, one needs to control for other factors. Specifically, one needs to control for the
overall effectiveness of the government/bureaucratic system to determine the extent to which
there is an independent link between a country's regulatory restrictiveness and its banking sector
development and the fragility of its banking system.  For these reasons measures of the way in
which a government/bureaucratic system functions are used in conducting our analyses.
Numerous measures of the functioning of the government were considered, but the focus
is on the following three:
REDTAPE, which represents an assessment of the degree to which the govemrnental
bureaucracy is an obstacle to business. Higher values of REDTAPE represent less
redtape, and a more smoothly functioning bureaucracy. 24 REDTAPE takes on values
between I and 10.
CORRUPT, which represents an assessment of corruption in government.  Higher values
of CORRUPT indicate high government officials are less likely to demand special
payments  for performing various services and signify that illegal payments are generally
less common throughout government.  CORRUPT takes on values between I and 10.
RULELAW,  which represents an assessment of the law and order tradition in the country
as determined by the International Country Risk Guide.  Higher values of RULELAW
indicate that a country adheres to the rule-of-law to a greater degree than countries with
lower values.  RULELAW takes on values between 1 and 10.25
In addition, we consider GOVERNMENT,  which is a composite index of the quality of the
government/bureaucratic system, and equals the average value of Redtape, Corrupt, and Rulelaw.
This means that higher values of GOVERNMENT indicate better functioning govemments.  The
average value of GOVERNMENT for the countries in our sample is 7.0, with a standard
24 Data  for REDTAPE  are obtained  from the Business  International  Corporation  and cover the early 1980s. For
more information, see Mauro (1995).
2  Data for CORRUPT and RULELAW cover the period 1982-1995 and are taken from LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes,18
deviation of 2.3.  There are three countries with values of 10 for GOVERNMENT: the
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland.  The United States has a value of 9.3, while Chiie
has a value of 7.2.  There are six countries with values below 4, indicating very poor
government/bureaucratic systems: Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the
Philippines.  It is also worth noting that other measures of the government/bureaucratic system
were considered, including (a) assessments of the risk of government repudiation of contracts, (b)
assessments of the risk of government expropriation of private poverty, and (c) assessments of
the efficiency of the judiciary system.  Incorporating these alternative indicators into the analyses
does not change any of the results that follow, however.
C.  Regulatory Restrictiveness and Quality of Government/Bureaucratic System
This subsection addresses question 1: Do countries with relatively weak government/bureaucratic
systems impose harsher regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks?
Table 1-A shows that countries with better government  systems (higher values of
GOVERNMENT) on average have less restrictive regulatory systems (lower values of
RESTRICT).  The negative relationship between better government and regulatory restrictions is
strongest for REAL ESTATE and NONFINANCIAL FIRM OWNERSHIP. 26 Table I-B shows
that these findings remain unchanged even after controlling both for the level of economic
development and for political stability. 27 Thus, countries with better functioning governments -
countries with less redtape, less corruption, and a strong rule-of-law - on average allow banks
Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1998),  who obtained  the data from the International  Country Risk Guide
26 It should  be pointed  out that we also examined  accounting  standards. The correlation  between  accounting
standards  and regulatory  restrictiveness  is -0.44,  with a P-value  of 0.005,  and the relationship  remains  significant  at
the 0.01  significance  level after  controlling  for GDP per capita  and measures  of political  stability.
27 To measure  the  level  of economic  development,  the  logarithm  of real  per capita  GDP  is used.  Political  instability19
the opportunity to provide their  customers a wider array of nontraditional services. 2"
These findings suggest it is possible to substitute among different government
mechanisms for overseeing bank behavior.  This is consistent with recent work on legal systems.
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), for instance, find that countries with
legal systems that impede minority shareholders from exerting their rights are more likely to
introduce mandatory dividends.  Our findings indicate that countries with weak governments -
that is, governments that are less likely to (a) supervise banks approximately or (b) create proper
incentives for private sector participants to supervise banks - also on average impose harsher
restrictions on the activities of banks. 29 Of course, there is a possibility that a third factor may be
responsible for both effects.  Political constraints, for instance, may prevent a government from
both improving the operation of the bureaucracy and relaxing regulatory restrictions on the
activities of banks.
D.  Regulatory Restrictiveness and Banking Sector Development and Efficiency
This subsection addresses question 2: Do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have
poorly functioning banking systems -- as measured by deposit money bank credit to the private
sector relative to GDP, bank overhead expenditures relative to total assets, and net interest
income relative to total assets?
To asses the relationship between regulatory restrictiveness and banking sector
development and efficiency, the following commonly used measures of the latter two variables
is a measure  of revolutions  and coups  obtained  from Banks  (1994).
2S These  results  also  hold for the individual  components  of GOVERNMENT.
29 We currently  are in the process  of collecting  more  detailed  information  on supervisory  systems,  which  will permit
a more  precise  evaluation  of this hypothesis.20
are used:
*  PRIVATE CREDIT, which is deposit money bank credit to the private sector relative to
GDP.
*  OVERHEAD, which is bank overhead expenditures relative to total assets.
*  NET INTEREST, which is net interest income relative to total assets. 30
Levine (1998) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (1998) find that PRIVATE CREDIT exerts a causal
and positive impact on long-run economic growth.  Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Min (1998) find
that OVERHEAD is also closely associated with more rapid economic growth in a broad cross-
section of countries.  Many researchers, moreover, use various indicators of interest rate margins,
such as NET INTEREST, to assess banking sector efficiency. 3'
Table 2 presents mixed results regarding the relationship between the degree of
regulatory,  restrictiveness and banking sector development and efficiency.  While countries with
more restrictive regulations on average have less bank credit, greater overhead expenditures, and
larger net interest income, the correlations are not very robust.  For instance, even though
RESTRICT and PRIVATE CREDIT are significantly negatively correlated, this relationship
breaks down when one controls for the level of economic development and political stability.
Similarly, of the regulatory restrictiveness indicators, OVERHEAD is significantly correlated
only with NONFINANCIAL FIRM OWNERSHIP, but even this relationship becomes
insignificant when one controls for the level of economic development and political stability.
Greater regulatory restrictiveness does remain positively correlated with NET INTEREST,
30PRIVATE CREDIT is from  Levine,  Loayza,  and Beck (1998).  It is an average over the period 1980-1995.
Also, see Levine (1998).  OVERHA and NET INTEREST are from Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Min (1998).  The
underlying data consist of stems from individual financial statements provided by BankScope and are averaged over
the period 1985-1995.
3'  See,  for example,  Claessens,  Demirguc-Kunt,  and Huizinga  (1997).21
however, even when one  controls for these other factors. Yet, this result mainly runs through
REAL ESTATE and NONFINANCIAL FIRM OWNERSHIP.  The finding may therefore be
simply due to the fact that harsher restrictions on REAL ESTATE and NONFINANCIAL FIRM
OWNERSHIP cause total assets of the banking sector to be less than otherwise, thereby
increasing NET INTEREST.  The relationship may, in other words, have nothing to do with
interest rate spreads per se. 32 Thus, one must conclude that there is not a reliable and direct link
between the degree of  regulatory restrictiveness and widely used measures of banking sector
development and efficiency.
E.  Regulatory Restrictiveness and Banking Crises 33
This subsection addresses question 3: Do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have
a lower probability of suffering a banking crisis?
To assess the impact of regulatory restrictiveness on banking sector fragility, two
measures of whether a country's banking system suffered a crisis during the last 15 years are
used.  First, a country is considered to have experienced a crisis when the estimated losses to the
government due to banking sector problems were greater than 5 percent of GDP.  Second, to
provide a more general indicator of fragility, a country is considered to have experienced a crisis
when the banking system was judged to be insolvent, even though eventual losses were less than
5 percent of GDP.  Since both indicators produce similar results, only results based upon the first
measure are reported here; that is, a country is considered to have experienced a crisis when the
estimated losses were greater than 5 percent of GDP.
3  Unfortunately,  the BankScope  data that  available  to us do not have interest  rate  spreads;  it has  only interest
income  and interest  expenses.22
The empirical results indicate there is a positive relationship between the degree of
regulatory restrictiveness -- especially restrictions on the securities activities of banks -- and
banking sector fragility. The relationships between banking crises and both the
government/bureaucratic system and regulatory environment are examined using both simple
correlations and probit regressions.  Table 3 presents the results based on the correlations. As
may be seen, there is a positive link between banking sector crises and the stringency of the
restrictions on banks' activities in the securities market business.  Also, there is a significantly
negative correlation between banking sector crises and good government/bureaucratic systems.
The empirical results based upon the Probit regressions support the contention that
countries restricting the securities activities of banks have significantly higher probabilities of
suffering a banking crisis than countries allowing banks greater freedom to engage in these
activities.  Table 4 presents the results based on the Probit regressions.  The dependent variable is
a dummy variable called CRISIS, where CRISIS equals I if a country suffered a banking crisis
and CRISIS equals 0 otherwise.
In the probit regressions, a wide array of control variables are included to more accurately
assess whether there is an independent link between banking crises and the degree of regulatory
restrictiveness on the activities of banks.  In particular, we control for the quality of both the
government/bureaucratic system and accounting standards since a close connection is observed
between poor government systems, poor accounting standards, and harsher regulatory
restrictiveness. Importantly, it is found that there is a significant link between the harshness of
bank securities restrictions and the likelihood of a banking crisis even after controlling for these
institutional factors.  We also control for the degree to which legal codes emphasize the rights of
33 This  subsection  builds  on Barth,  Caprio,  and  Levine  (1998).23
secured  creditors  and minority  shareholders,  since  the contracting  environment  may  influence
incentives  facing  bank managers  and pressures  for regulatory  interventions. Even  after
controlling  for these legal characteristics,  however,  the findings  still indicate  that greater
restrictions  on the securities  activities  of banks produce  a significantly  higher probability  of a
banking  crisis.
As an additional  check on the robustness  of this finding,  we control  for the overall level
of economic  development  and the development  of the financial  system by including  measures  of
the level of GDP per capita,  the recent economic  growth  rate, and the size of the banking  system.
After controlling  for these economic  and financial  development  indicators,  the legal
characteristics,  and the institutional  variables,  the results still indicate  that countries  restricting
the securities  activities  of banks have significantly  higher probabilities  of suffering  a banking
crisis  than countries  with less restrictive  regulatory  practices. Furthermore,  an attempt  was
made to control  for bank franchise  value by including  measures  of: (a) the net interest  income  of
banks (NET INTEREST  MARGIN)  and (b) the concentration  of the banking  sector,  which
equals the percentage  of total banking  system  assets accounted  for by the five largest  banks.
Again,  the findings  remain  unchanged  -- a positive and statistically  significant  relationship
between  the harshness  of the restrictions  on the securities  activities  of banks and a banking  sector
crisis exists. 34
There may  be concerns  about  endogeneity. Countries  with a fragile  banking  system  may
adopt restrictive  banking  sector  regulations. Thus, the Table  4 Probit  results may suffer  from
3  We also included  a dummy  variable  indicating  whether  a country  has an explicit  deposit insurance  scheme  since
Demirguc-Kunt  and Detragiache  (1997, 1998) find  that deposit  insurance  regimes  are positively  associated  with
banking crises. The inclusion  of this variable  does not change  our findings  regarding  regulatory  restrictions  on bank
securities  activities.24
simultaneity bias.  To control for potential simultaneity bias, we use a two-step instrumental
variable estimator. 35 We tried a number of different instrumental variables.  Here, we report the
results using the legal origin of each country as an instrumental variable for regulatory
restrictiveness. Legal scholars show that much of the world can be divided into countries with
either a English, French, German, or Scandinavian legal heritage.  Since legal heritage was
determined far in the past and was frequently driven by colonization and conquest, we treat legal
heritage as exogenous to whether the country experienced a banking crisis recently.  Moreover, a
country's legal origin has a profound effect on the specific laws, regulations, and enforcement
mechanisms that govern financial sector activities [LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1998].  Thus, we use an instrumental variable Probit estimator to gauge the causal
impact of regulatory restrictiveness on banking sector fragility.
The Table 5 results indicate that simultaneity bias is not driving the positive relationship
between restrictions on bank engaging in securities market activities and banking sector fragility.
That is, when banks face greater restrictions on their ability to engage in securities market
activities, banks have a higher probability of suffering a banking crisis.  While the data provide
less confident results on bank restrictiveness in general, the data are consistent with the view that
lowering restrictions on the securities market activities of banks will boost, rather than
jeopardize, banking sector stability.
The relationship between regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks and banking
system crises, moreover, is economically quite large. The coefficient estimates suggest that a
rise in restrictiveness by one -- that is, SECURITIES rises by one - produces an increase in the
35  The instrumental  variable  estimator  is analogous  to the two-stage  least squares,  except  that it must be
appropriately  modified  to limited  dependent  variable  framework.  This is described  in Maddala's  (1983) textbook,25
probability of a banking crisis by between 25 and 33 percentage points depending on the specific
control variables included.  This particular evaluation is based upon the mean values of the
variables in the regression equation. 3"  Thus, in addition to being statistically significant, the
empirical results suggest that restricting the ability of banks to diversify their activities influences
their fragility in an economically important manner.
The finding that restrictions on the securities activities of banks on average sigr ificantly
increase the likelihood of banking sector fragility is consistent with evaluations of events during
the Great Depression in the U. S. White (1983, 1986), for example, shows that banks that were
engaged in investment banking activities during the 1  930s were better diversified and tius  less
likely to fail than banks that were not involved in the securities market business. 37 Although
more research surely is needed, these results suggest that even after controlling for many relevant
features of national economies, allowing banks greater freedom to engage in securities activities
reduces the likelihood of banking crises.
IV.  Directions for Future Research
A more extensive dataset, both in terms of the variables included and the range of countries, will
enable us to provide better information and thus better advice on appropriate regulatory reforms.
For example, our finding that banks with more diversified powers are less likely to suffer a
banking crisis may be sensitive to other components of the regulatory environment, which for
now are omitted variables in our analysis.  It may be that  countries that allow broader powers to
Limited  Dependent  and Qualitative  Variables  in Economics  (New York:  Cambridge  University  Press).
36 Since  the Probit  technique  is a nonlinear  estimation  procedure,  the implied  effect  of a given change in
SECURITIES  on the probability  of a crisis is nonlinear  and depends  on the precise  characteristics  of the individual
country  involved  in  the conceptual  experiment.
3  Note that in  the U. S. in  the period  before  the enactment  of the Glass-Steagall  Act,  big banks  were most likely  to
be involved  in investment  banking  activities.  This  confounds  some  of White's  (1983, 1986)  analyses. In our study,
however,  we  study  the  whole  regulatory  regime,  which  reduces  this  complication.  Also,  see  Kroszner  and  Rajan26
banks, for example, also have higher capital requirements or better supervision.  Or it may be
that they are the countries that have more foreign banks, who may well be better at risk
management.  One should also consider the organizational structure of banks that engage in
wider range of activities.  Whether the activities are conducted within bank itself or through
subsidiaries or affiliates may matter.  More generally, it seems increasingly clear that the new
global and technological environment requires regulation and supervision that focuses on the
performance of the financial system as a whole.  One should therefore consider the extent to
which regulations directed at one specific component of a country's financial system spill over to
other components as well as to the financial systems of other country's.  In any event, in order to
increase the robustness of any policy recommendations, these types of extensions are important
and will be the subject of future research.
(1994), and Rajan (1998).27
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Table 1
The Relationship Between Regulatory Restrictiveness and the Quality of
Government /Bureaucratic Systems: Empirical Results
A.  Correlations
Restrict  Securities  Insurance  Real Estate  Nonfinancial
Firm
Ownership
Government  -0.436  -0.220  -0.207  -0.364  -0.449
{0.004}  {0.140}  {0. 144}  {0.037}  {0.007}
B. Regressions
Restrict  Securities  Insurance  Real Estate  Nonfinancial
Firm
_______________  ___________  __________O  w  nership
constant  3.778  0.977  7.468  3.622  2.323
(0.006)  (0.  579)  (0.000)  (0.  052)  (0.322)
Economic  -0.044  0.215  -0.638  0.047  0.317
Development  (0.813)  (0.430)  (0.020)  (0.853)  (0.3  79)
Revolution &  -1.009  -0.674  -0.840  -1.376  -1.420
Coups  (0.001)  (0.023)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.011)
Government  -0.156  -0.162  0.078  -0.206  -0.370
(0.008)  (0.083)  (0.323)  (0.008)  (0.007)
R-squared  0.33  0.12  0.18  0.23  0.29
Prob(F-statistic)  0.00  0.17  0.05  0.01  0.00
Notes:
P-Values  appear in brackets.
GOVERNMENT  equals  the average  value  of REDTAPE,  CORRUPT  and RULELAW.
RESTRICT  equals  the average  value  of SECURITIES,  INSURANCE,  REAL  ESTATE,  NONFINANCIAL
FIRM  OWNERSHIP.29
Table 2
The Relationship  Between Regulatory  Restrictiveness  and Banking  Sector
Development:  Empirical  Results
A.  Correlations
Private  Credit  Overhead  Net Interest
Restrict  -0.37  0.24  0.31
(0.0081  {0.131]  (0.020]
Securities  -0.21  0.24  0.21
(0.169)  (0.095)  (0.  105)
Insurance  -0.10  -0.06  -0.05
to.258.)  (0.8692  ,O.908,
Real Estate  -0.34  0.17  0.32
0.0 12)  (0..153)  (0.009)
Nonfinancial  -0.41  0.33  0.38
Firm  (0.017)  (0.038)  /0.006)
Ownership
B. Regressions
Private  Credit  Overhead  Net Interest
constant  -58.44  -0.84  1.01
(0.333)  (0.898)  (0.827)
Economic  15.44  0.16  -0.04
Development  (0.007)  t0.802)  (0.921)
Revolution &  -14.47  2.91  1.62
Coups  (0.195)  (0.180)  (0.172)
Restrict  -11.66  1.26  1.22
(0.196)  (0.106)  (0.023)
R-squared  0.38  0.13  0.17
Prob(F-statistic)  (0.000)  0o.152)  to.066)
Notes:
P-Values appear in brackets.30
Table  3
The Relationship  Between Banking Crises, Government/Bureaucratic  Systems, and  Regulatory
Restrictiveness:  Empirical  Results
A. Correlations
Government  Restrict  Securities  Insurance  Real Estate  Nonfinancial
Firm
Ownership
CRISIS  -0.37  0.30  0.39  -0.07  0.30  0.29
(0.016]  (0.047]  (0.009)  (0.872)  (0.065)  (0.089)
B. Quartile Grouping by Government/Bureaucratic Systems
Crisis  Restrict  Securities  Insurance  Real Estate  Nonfinancial
Firm
Ownership
Very Poor Government  0.62  2.33  1.82  2.73  2.58  2.18
Poor Government  0.33  2.12  1.80  2.20  2.80  1.67
Good Government  0.33  1.89  1.27  2.45  2.09  I .73
Very Good Government  0.17  1.98  1.58  2.17  2.25  1.92
C. Quartile Grouping by Regulatory Restrictiveness
CRISIS  GOVERNMENT
Very Restrictive  0.63  5.92
Restrictive  0.56  5.19
Permissive  0.25  7.71
Very Permissive  0.25  7.68
Note: Crisis equals one when the estimated cost of a banking crisis is greater than 5 percent of GDP (18 countries), zero otherwise.31
Table 4
Explaining  the Likelihood of Banking  Crises: Probit  Regressions with  Bank  Securities  Restrictions  and
Bank  Composite Regulatory  Restrictions
(Dependent variable: Crisis=l, No Crisis=O)
Other Explanatory Variables  Coefricient  on Securities  CoeMcient  on Restrict
Activities  Restrictions
Constant  0.79  0.88
(0.019)  (o.  01S)
Constant,  Government,  Account  0.87  0.86
(0.024)  (0.051)
Constant,  Government,  Account,  1.05  0.96
(0.015)  (0.043)
Creditor  & Shareholder  Rights
Constant,  Government,  Account,
Creditor  & Shareholder  Rights,  1.02  1.05
Private  Credit, Initial  Income,  Growth  (0.021)  (0.04 1)
Notes
P-Values  appear in  brackets.
Crisis  equals one when  the estimated  cost of a banking  crisis is greater  than 5 percent  of GDP (18 countries),  zero otherwise.32
Table 5
Explaining the Likelihood of Banking Crises:
Instrumental Variable Probit Regressions
with Bank Securities Restrictions and
Bank Composite Regulatory Restrictions
(Dependent  variable:  Crisis=l, No Crisis=O)
Other Explanatory Variables  Coefficient  on Securities  Coefricient  on Restrict
Activities  Restrictions
Constant  0.86  0.52
(0.014)  (0./17)
Constant,  Government,  Account  1.04  0.84
(0.010)  (0.056)
Constant,  Government,  Account,  1.24  1.05
(0.008)  (0.035)
Creditor  & Shareholder  Rights
Constant,  Government,  Account,
Creditor  & Shareholder  Rights,  1.24  1.48
Private  Credit,  Initial  Income,  Growth  (0.013)  (0.027)
Notes:
P-Values  appear  in brackets.
Crisis  equals  one when the estimated  cost  of a banking  crisis is greater  than 5 percent  of GDP (18 countries),  zero otherwise.
Legal  origin  variables  (English,  French,  German,  and Scandinavian)  are used as instruments  for regulatory  restrictiveness  variables.  Other variables
in the conditioning  information  set are treated  as exogenous.33
Appendix Table 1
Quantitative Measures of Regulatory Restrictiveness  for Sample Countries
Country  Securities  Insurance  Real Estate  Nonfinancial Firm  Restrict
Ownership
Argentina  3  2  2  3  2.50
Australia  1  2  3  2  2.00
Austria  1  2  1  1  1.25
Belgium  2  2  3  3  2.50
Brazil  2  2  3  3  2.50
Canada  2  2  2  3  2.25
Chile  2  3  4  4  3.25
Colombia  2  2  2  4  2.50
Denmark  1  2  2  2  1.75
Ecuador  2  4  4  3.33
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2  2  3  3  2.50
Finland  1  3  2  1  1.75
France  1  2  2  1  1.50
Germany  1  3  2  1  1.75
Greece  2  3  3  1  2.25
Hong Kong  1  2  2  3  2.00
India  2  4  3  3  3.00
Indonesia  2  4  4  4  3.50
Ireland  1  4  1  1  1.75
Israel  1  1  I  1  1.00
Italy  1  2  3  3  2.25
Japan  3  4  3  3  3.25
Korea  2  2  2  3  2.25
Malaysia  I  I  1  2  1.25
Mexico  2  2  3  4  2.75
Netherlands  1  2  2  1  1.50
New Zealand  2  2  2  1  1.75
Nigeria  1  2  2  2  1.75
Norway  2  2  2  2  2.00
Pakistan  2  4  3  2  2.75
Peru  2  4  3  4  3.25
Philippines  1  2  2  2  1.75
Portugal  1  2  3  2  2.00
Singapore  2  2  2  3  2.25
South Africa  1  2  3  2  2.00
Spain  1  2  3  1  1.75
Sri Lanka  I  1  1.00
Sweden  1  2  3  3  2.25
Switzerland  1  2  1  1  1.25
Thailand  2  2  2  3  2.25
Turkey  1  2  4  3  2.50
United Kingdom  1  2  1  1  1.25
United States  3  3  3  3  3.00
Uruguay  3  2  3  4  3.00
Venezuela  2  2  3  3  2.5034
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